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  The destruction of the Central Asia-wide electricity 
grid has not only demonstrated the fragility of energy 
arrangements in the region but also the lack of political 
co-operation among regional states in general. 
    Kazakhstan’s  and  Uzbekistan’s  recent  decisions  to 
withdraw  from  the  Central  Asian  electricity  grid  may 
deprive almost all the countries in the region of access 
to  the  common  power  system  uniting  all  the  energy 
resources.  This  may  lead  to  a  severe  energy  crisis  in 
Tajikistan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  to  failures  in  the  work  of 
separate energy systems, to a revision of agreements on 
sharing of water and consequently to political, social and 
economic instability in the region.  
  The Soviet Union created a common power system 
for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan which worked as long as these countries 
were part of the Soviet Union. But the system began to 
fray at the edges after 1991, as the newly independent 
countries began to assert competing interests. 
  Electricity-generating capacity is distributed unevenly 
in Central Asia. Mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
have  close  to  80%  of  the  region’s  water  resources, 
allowing them to build and benefit from hydroelectric 
power  stations,  whereas  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan have substantial oil and gas deposits but 
depend on their smaller neighbours for water. 
  Disputes arise whenever Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan store 
up water for the winter, the season when they need it 
most for electricity production. The three lowland states 
want the water to flow downstream in spring and summer 
to provide irrigation during the growing season. 
      Uzbekistan  exports  natural  gas  to  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan.  It  has  been  supplying 
electricity to Tajikistan directly, and also has served as a 
transit country for Kyrgyz and Turkmen electricity. 
      Currently  no  country  with  an  interest  in  regional 
stability  will  benefit  from  leaving  and  destroying  the 
common energy grid. The destruction of the regional 
distribution network may have drastic consequences for 
all the countries in the region.  
  First. One of the consequences would be to increase 
the number of outages due to accidents, as there would 
be no central mechanism for mitigating the effects of 
power surges by switching supplies from one country 
to another. For instance, if Uzbekistan, centrally located 
with  the  four  other  states  around  it,  were  to  leave, 
everyone else’s national grid would be placed under severe 
strain.  Tajikistan  and  Kyrgyzstan  would  be  the  worst 
hit, despite existing hydroelectric schemes and plans to 
build more. Soghd province in the north of Tajikistan depends on Uzbek electricity coming from the common 
energy grid. Soghd’s power plant at Kairakkum provides 
only 20% of the energy consumed there. If Uzbekistan 
leaves, two million people in Soghd region will be left 
without power.Central and southern Tajikistan will also 
lose out as they will no longer receive power generated 
in  Turkmenistan  and  transferred  through  Uzbekistan. 
Kyrgyzstan, too, will suffer from the loss of electricity 
coming from or via Uzbekistan. However, the northern 
regions of the country would probably struggle through, 
by keeping a power station in the southern Jambyl region 
in Kazakhstan running continuously. 
  Second. The larger states will face significant problems 
just as smaller Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will. Neither 
Uzbekistan nor Kazakhstan are currently in a position 
to  assure  a  constant,  uninterrupted  flow  of  power. 
Kazakhstan might leave, but it will mean additional costs, 
including the expense of building the infrastructure that 
will be required. If Uzbekistan goes, it will have supply 
problems at peak periods in the morning and evening. 
Without the Nurek power plant in Tajikistan, it will be 
technically problematic and costly for Uzbekistan to meet 
this peak consumption. The Uzbek energy grid also needs 
Kyrgyz power in order to regulate a constant current. 
  Third. Aside from periodic electricity shortages, the 
breakdown of regional energy arrangements will have 
wider  implications  including  the  problems  of  water 
sharing.  For one thing, neither the Tajiks nor the Kyrgyz 
will have much of an incentive to honour the already loose 
arrangements for opening up the dam sluices in spring to 
let water down the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, so that 
their neighbours have enough to irrigate their fields. Their 
natural reaction will be to hold as much water back until 
late autumn, when they need to begin generating more 
power by releasing water. Within the Soviet Union, water 
and fuel were exchanged between republics as free, shared 
commodities. But in the post-1991 world, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have become increasingly annoyed that their 
neighbours charge them for gas, oil and coal, yet their 
own natural resource – water – still has no monetary 
value placed on it. For instance, Tajikistan stores up the 
waters of the Syr Darya river in its Kairakkum reservoir 
for release to Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan when 
they need it “virtually for nothing”. It will be difficult 
to reach a water agreement on previous terms after the 
Uzbek power supply to Soghd region has been interrupted 
this winter.                                                                             
  Fourth. The disputes over water and energy which are 
inextricably linked with the political differences between 
the Central Asian states may lead to escalation of internal 
political and social instability in the countries of the region. 
There is a risk that the situation may worsen, and the 
most affected would be ordinary people, with shortages 
of power and water and limits on freedom of movement 
that may lead to deteriorating conditions along borders 
and inter-ethnic tensions. Uzbekistan’s unhappiness with 
the current electricity arrangements forms part of a wider 
pattern of disagreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
over  their  plans  to  complete  major  new  hydropower 
schemes.  The  Roghun  and  Kambarata  power  plants 
would  bring  Tajikistan  and  Kyrgyzstan,  respectively,  a 
lot closer to self-sufficiency in energy. But Uzbekistan 
worries that the new dams would block off water from 
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, and is insisting on an 
international study on the possible effects of the projects 
before they are completed. 
Russia’s role in the region is an added complicating factor. 
Uzbeks are concerned about talks of Moscow investing 
in both the Roghun and Kambarata schemes, and also 
about plans for a new Russian military base in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, not far from their border. Movement towards 
fully independent power networks and building separate 
infrastructure is becoming the only possible solution for 
all the regional states after the destruction of common 
power  network  and  under  the  prevailing  political 
conditions,  although  it  goes  against  the  international 
trend towards greater cooperation and efficiency through 
economies of scale. 
The Central Asian states are already taking steps to forge 
new one-to-one arrangements with one another while 
strengthening  their  own  national  grids.  The  Kazaks, 
Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Uzbeks are currently working towards 
bilateral and trilateral deals on infrastructure and supply, 
bypassing the regional level at which agreement seems 
too difficult. The countries in the region are making great 
efforts to ensure energy security by making their own 
grids more autonomous and developing new capacity. 
The  destruction  of  a  common  energy  system  only 
strengthened their desire for energy independence.  
  Despite the steps taken by the countries in the region 
to ensure their own energy security, the need for regional 
co-operation and the political will and ability to reach 
agreements remains the important condition for political, 
social  and  economic  stability  in  Central  Asia.  More 
rapid conflicts on energy and water issues in the region 
urgently require transition of the regional energy system 
to market relations in line with the international practice. 
Energy resources, meanwhile, must stop being the tools 
for economic and political pressure.  